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To the Editor: Triple-reassortant 
swine inﬂ  uenza viruses (SIVs), which 
contain genes from human, swine, 
and avian inﬂ   uenza A viruses, have 
been enzootic among swine herds in 
the United States since the late 1990s 
(1). Although uncommon, occasional 
transmission of triple-reassortant 
SIVs from swine to humans has 
occurred (2–4). Before April 2009, 
only limited, nonsustained human-
to-human transmission of SIVs had 
been reported (5–7). Although an 
animal source for pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 virus has yet to be identiﬁ  ed, 
the pandemic strain resulted from the 
reassortment of 2 different lineages of 
SIV (8).
On July 28, 2009, a 12-year-
old Kansas boy sought treatment for 
fever, cough, and sore throat. Results 
of an inﬂ  uenza rapid antigen test were 
positive, and a specimen was sent to 
the Kansas Department of Health and 
Environment for further testing. Real-
time reverse transcription PCR (rRT-
PCR) testing determined the virus 
contained the surface hemagglutinin 
(HA) gene of inﬂ  uenza A (H3) and the 
internal nucleoprotein gene common 
to all triple-reassortant SIVs (9). The 
specimen was sent to the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention 
(Atlanta, GA, USA) on August 3 and 
identiﬁ   ed as swine-origin inﬂ  uenza 
virus A (H3N2) by rRT-PCR and 
sequence analysis.
The patient reported that during 
July 23–25, 2009, he touched healthy-
appearing swine multiple times 
while attending a county fair. The 
boy received a standard treatment 
course of oseltamivir and recovered 
completely. None of his 3 household 
contacts attended the fair, and none 
reported signs or symptoms of illness 
in the weeks afterward.
The Kansas Department of Health 
and Environment and the local health 
department collaborated with the 
county extension ofﬁ   ce to identify 
and interview swine exhibitors at the 
county fair, focusing on inﬂ  uenza 
symptoms among exhibitors and 
household contacts during the week 
before and after the fair. Twenty-seven 
(79%) of 34 exhibitors participated 
in the survey; none reported signs or 
symptoms of inﬂ  uenza-like  illness, 
deﬁ  ned as fever (temperature >100°F) 
accompanied by either cough or sore 
throat. Two household contacts of 
separate exhibitors each reported a 
low-grade fever (<100°F) and sore 
throat in the week after the fair. Both 
touched swine while attending the 
fair. Both visited a physician’s ofﬁ  ce; 
neither was tested for inﬂ  uenza; and 
symptoms of both resolved without 
treatment. The veterinarian overseeing 
the swine barn reported no signs of 
respiratory illness among the swine 
during the fair. Most swine exhibited 
were slaughtered at the fair’s 
conclusion.
On August 7, the Kansas Animal 
Health Department collected nasal 
swab specimens and blood samples 
from 13 swine belonging to 7 
exhibitors. All samples were delivered 
to the Kansas State Veterinary 
Diagnostic Laboratory for analysis 
by inﬂ   uenza matrix rRT-PCR and 
virus isolation on nasal swab samples 
and hemagglutination inhibition (HI) 
assays against classical swine inﬂ  uenza 
virus (H1N1) (A/swine/Iowa/73) 
and the prototype swine inﬂ  uenza 
virus (H3N2) (A/swine/Texas/98) 
on serum samples. In addition, the 
inﬂ  uenza virus (H3N2) “county fair” 
isolate, A/Kansas/13/2009 (H3N2), 
was sent from the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, ampliﬁ  ed, 
and used to develop a second HI 
assay that included the original swine 
serum samples as well as paired 
convalescent-phase samples from 3 of 
the swine (Table). 
Inﬂ   uenza matrix RT-PCR and 
virus isolation on nasal swab samples 
were negative. HI assays demonstrated 
little or no antibody against the 
inﬂ  uenza (H1N1) indicator virus and 
low-level antibody reaction against 
the prototype swine inﬂ  uenza  virus 
(H3N2). However, HI titers against the 
“county fair” inﬂ  uenza virus (H3N2) 
showed consistently elevated titers, 
which suggested that the animals 
might have been exposed to the virus 
2 weeks earlier, during the time of 
the fair. The swine may have cleared 
the virus by the time the nasal swabs 
were collected, but without positive 
RT-PCR or virus isolation results, the 
situation remain inconclusive.
We compared the HA gene 
segment of A/Kansas/13/2009 (H3N2) 
with recent animal and human 
inﬂ   uenza (H3N2) viruses by using 
the neighbor-joining method, and it 
clustered with the HA from recent 
triple-reassortant SIV (H3N2) isolates 
(online Appendix Figure, www.
cdc.gov/EID/content/17/6/1143-
appF.htm) (10). A/Kansas/13/2009 
(H3N2) shares >97% nucleotide 
identity with 2 swine viruses reported 
to have caused human infections, 
A/Ontario/RV1273/2005 and A/
Ontario/1252/2007, and >90% 
nucleotide identity with currently 
circulating seasonal (H3N2) 
viruses, such as A/Perth/16/2009. 
Sequence analysis for the remaining 
7 gene segments conﬁ  rmed  A/
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Kansas/13/2009 as triple-reassortant 
SIV (H3N2), belonging to the same 
lineages as the genes for the reference 
virus A/swine/Texas/98 (data not 
shown). A full genome sequence for 
A/Kansas/13/2009 (H3N2) has been 
submitted to GenBank (accession 
nos. GU937743–GU937750).
This case emphasizes the 
importance of epidemiologic and 
laboratory surveillance in areas where 
humans and swine are in close contact. 
When novel inﬂ  uenza  A  infection 
occurs in humans, joint investigations 
by local, state, and federal public 
health and animal health agencies 
are key to determining the source of 
infection and extent of transmission. 
The worldwide spread of pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus emphasizes 
the ongoing public health threat of 
interspecies inﬂ  uenza  transmission. 
Improved surveillance among swine 
may lead to early identiﬁ  cation  of 
novel viruses with pandemic potential 
and provide early opportunities to 
implement control measures.
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Table. Hemagglutination inhibition assay titers for 3 influenza strains from swine 
exhibited at county fair, by date of blood draw, Kansas, 2009* 
Swine 
ID no. 
August 7 titers  August 31 titers 
Subtype 
H1N1† 
Subtype 
H3N2‡ 
“County fair,” 
subtype H3N2§ 
Subtype 
H3N2‡ 
“County fair,” 
subtype H3N2§ 
1 <10 20 320 ¶ ¶
2 <10 10 160 ¶ ¶
3 <10 40 640 ¶ ¶
4 <10 40 640 ¶ ¶
5 <10 80 640 ¶ ¶
6 <10 40 640 ¶ ¶
7 <10 320 640 ¶ ¶
8 10 10 160 ¶ ¶
9 <10 80 640 ¶ ¶
10 <10 40 320 <10 80
11 <10 80 320 10 320
12 <10 20 160 20 80
13 10 <10 40 ¶ ¶
*HI, hemagglutination inhibition; ID, identification. 
†Strain A/Swine/Iowa/79 (H1N1). 
‡Strain A/Swine/Texas/98 (H3N2). 
§Strain A/Kansas/13/2009 (H3N2). 
¶Ten of the original 13 swine were slaughtered before convalescent-phase serum could be 
collected. 